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Changing Patterns of Conflict: 
Di ssent to D enials of Review in the Burger Court* 
S. SIDNEY ULMER 
University of Kentuc ky 
WILLIAM W. NICHOLLS , }R . 
Texas Technological University 
I nt1·od-uction 
Research on the Supreme Court has given increased attention in recent 
year to two propositions: the first is that the Court engages in a multiplicity of 
significant activities other than deciding plenary cases; 1 the second is that the 
behavior of th e Court's justices is not a constant. 2 Both these propositions 
have re levance for this paper. 
By now , we are all familiar with the te levision portrayal of an American 
Indian paddling a canoe down a river that becomes more and more polluted as 
he moves along. The Indian is seen to embark near a heavily littered highway . 
A bag of trash lands at his feet. A tear b·ickles slowly down his cheek. Then 
comes the slogan: "Peop le start pollution. People can stop it." In analyzing the 
subtleties of this message Paletz, Pearson and Willis suggest tha t by defining 
the environm ental problem as litter and placing the blame on the individual , 
eco nomic institutions and public officials are relieved of responsibility . 3 The 
anti-pollution fight becomes an anti-litter fight which serve to disb·act atten-
tion from automobile emissions, smokestack debris, and non-returnab le bot-
tles and cans. 
In a similar vein, to focus on the plenary Supreme Court case - i.e ., those 
cases that have bee n fully briefed , orally argued, and decided with published 
vote and writt en opinions - suggests to th e public and to students of the 
Court that the significant work of that institution is to be found in such cases. 
And that one may understand the role of the Cour t in American life solely 
through a study of these case . Th e work of other scho lars, howev er, suggests 
that additional areas of a court's work may have great significance for th 
* The researc h on which this pap er i based was supported by the National Science Foundation , 
Grant #SOC 77-26066. An ear lier ver ion of the pap er was prese nt ed at the annual me eting of 
the Southern Politi cal Science Association , Atlanta , Georgia, November 9-11, 1978. 
1 S. Sidney Ulmer, "Researchin g th e Supreme Court in a Democrati c-Pluralist System : Some 
Thoughts on New Dir ections," Law and Policy Quarterly , Vol. 1, #1 Uan. 1979), 53-80. 
2 Ulmer, "Dim ensiona lity and Change in Judi cial Behavior" in J. Herndon (ed .) Math emati cal 
App licatio ns in Political Science - VJ/, University of Virginia Pr ess (1974) pp . 40-67. 
3 David L. Paletz, Robert a E. Pearso n, Donald L. Willis, Politics in Public Service Adoertis-
i,ig , Praege r Publishin g Co. (1978). 
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socio/political system in which the court functions . 4 These "other activities" 
include summary decision making , docket control, and the whole panoply of 
actions by which courts select cases for review. Under the auspices of the 
NSF, the senior author of this pap er is currently engaged in a 2 year study of 
the proc esses by which th e Supr eme Court constructs its annual agenda of 
cases for plenary consideration. The present paper reports some resea rch 
done on a limited aspect of that general probl em - specifically, on access 
decision conflicts. Th e long range purpos e of studying such conflicts is to 
ascertain their possibl e impact on the selection of cases for review. Howev er , 
we do not get into that larger qu estion in this pap er. 
Th e second proposition regarding behavioral change is not absolutely new 
or novel. But only in rece nt years have attempts to study chang e in th e 
behavior of th e justi ces on a systematic or patt ern ed basis been und ertaken . 5 
To this point most stud ents of th e Court have emphasiz ed the consistency of 
its decisions , whether for purpos es of stare decisis or th e psychological needs 
of the justices for personal consistency as arti culated by such th eories as 
commitment, and cognitive dissonanc e. 6 
Apart from psychological theory , the judiciary itself frequently comments 
on th e importance of stability in the law. Thus , writing in 1921, Cardozo 
remarked: " ... the labor of judg es would be increase d almost to the br eaking 
point if every past decision could be reopened in eve ry case , and one could not 
lay one 's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the cours es laid by 
4 Joseph Tan enhau s et. al., "The Supreme Coul't's Certiorari Juri sdiction: Cue Theory " in G. 
Schubert , Judi cial Decision Making, Free Press (1962), pp . 111-132; Lawr ence Baum, "Policy 
Goals in Judi cial Gatekeeping: A Proximity Model of Discretionary Juri sdiction," American 
Journal of Political Science , Vol. 8 (1977), pp. 13-35; Ulmer , "Se lecting Cases for Suprem e Cou rt 
Review: An Underdog Mode l," American Political Science Review, Vol. 72 (Sept. 1978) pp. 
902-10, and sources cited therein ; and D oris M. L . Provine, Case Selection in the Uni ted States 
Supreme Cou rt , (Ph .D . Thes is, Cornell University , August 1978). 
5 For example, see: Ulmer, "Th e Longitudinal Behavior of Hugo Lafayette Black: Parabolic 
Support for Civil Libert ies, 1937-1971," Florida State University Law Review, Vol. 1 #1 , pp. 
131-153; and Ulmer , "Para bolic Support of Civil Lib erty Claims: The Case of William 0. 
Dou glas," j ournal of Poli.tics, Vol. 41, o. 2, pp. 634-639. 
6 For such theories, cf. Carl I. Hovland et. al. (eds. ) The Order of Presentation in Persuasion , 
Yale Unive rsity Press (1957), pp . 23-32; Charles A. Kiesler, The Psychology of Commitmen t: 
Experiments Linking Behaoior to Belief, Academic Press (1971). Similar psychological perspec-
tives have been featured rece ntly in two papers authored by Burt on Atkins. Using a commitme nt 
theory framework Atkins examined the work of Warren Burger compar ing his behavior as a D . C. 
Circuit Court judge with his subsequent behavior in the Suprem e Court. Atkins infers a high leve l 
of consis tency between the values arti culated by Burger in the lower court and those str essed in 
his Supreme Cour t op inions/vo tes. ("Chief Justice Burge r and the Criminal Offender in the U.S. 
Supreme Court : Or , the Det 1·ministic Source of Free Will Perspective." ) (Paper delivered at the 
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association , April 29-May 1, 1971, Chicago.) 
("Th e Longitudinal Context of Judi cial Behavior : The Case of Chief Ju tice Warren Burger," 
1974, unpublished .) What is needed , howeve r, is an analysis of a number of justices with prior 
serv ice on Cour ts of Appeals to determ ine if Atkins ' findings regarding Burger rep resent gene ral 
phenomena . The juni or au thor of this paper is cu rr ently engaged in such research as a dissertation 
project at th e University of Kentucky. 
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others who had gone befor e him . "7 But Cardo zo, unlik e some psychological 
theorists, emphasiz ed th e need to change behavior on occasion - not in a 
random or b·ansient mann er but a chang e in dire ction of decision consistent 
with th e wishes of th e community. Thus , he added:" .. . when a rul e, after it 
has bee n duly tested by expe rience, has bee n found to be inconsist ent with the 
sense of justic e or with social welfare, th ere should be less hesitation in frank 
disavowal and foll abandonment. ... If judg es have woefully misint erpret ed 
th e mores of their day , or if th e mores of theiT day are no longer thos e of ours, 
th y ought not to tie , in helpl ess submission , the hands of theiT successors. "8 
The resea rch we wish to report focuses on conflict over review decisions as 
represented by dissen ts to denials of rev iew. 9 But it is concerned , at th e same 
time , with chang e in those conflicts over time . We do not quarr el with 
Cardozo s suggestion that change in mores is one cause of or justification for 
change in judicial behavior. We believe , howeve r , that other changes in th e 
Cou rt's envirnnm ent can lead to chang e in the behavior of th e justic es both in 
deciding plenary cases and in other decisional activities. 
Conflict as a Function of Change in Gou.rt Composition 
Like all decision making bodi es , th e U. S. Supr eme Court function s in an 
enviro nm ent which imposes limiting conditions on its decisional processes. 
And like all decision making environm ent s, th ese conditions are subject to 
chang e. It has long been conceded that a major limiting condition on the work 
of th e Court is th e makeup of the Court itself . As that makeup changes, the 
Court 's dec isions at various leve ls are likely to be affected - certainly that is 
the case if th e chang e in composition is of significant proportions and involves 
the exchang e of justices who are not ideologically fungibl e. 10 
When a new Supr eme Court justic e is appointed, he brings to th e Court 
cer tain pr edispositions . If , philosophically , the new justi ce is an exact copy of 
the ju stice he replaces, the ideological composition of the Court remains 
unchanged. How ever , that is unlik ely eve r to be the case. In general, one may 
as ume that any change in th e composition of th e Court's mem hers introduc es 
some chang e in ideological mix. Since it is well known that ideology influences 
case deci ion , 11 it is not unr easonabl e to expect change in th e mix of ideologies 
7 Benjamin Cardozo , The Nature of the Jud icial Process, New Haven: Yale niversity Press , 
1921, p. 149. 
8 Ibid., pp . 150-152. Should one think such a philosophy the ancient one of a long dead justice, 
it may be noted that Cardozo 's words are quoted approving ly and used as a basis for decision by 
Justice Stevens as recently as 1976. (Runyan v. McCrory 965 S. Ct. 2603). 
9 "dissents to d nials of review " as used here encompass dissents to denials of certiorari and to 
dismissals of appeals. Although dismissal of an appea l may have precedential value it constitut es a 
refusal to grant plenary review of a case and has the same effect as a denial of a writ of certiorari in 
allowing the decision of the court immedia tely below to stand. 
10 Stephen L. Wasby, Continuity and Change : From the Warren Court to the Burger Court , 
Pacific Palisades : Goodyear Publishing Co. (1976) and The Supreme Court in the Fecleraljudicia/ 
System, New York: Holt , Rinehart & Winston (1978). 
11 Glendon Schubert , The Jud icial Mind Revisited , Honolulu: Unive rsity of Hawaii (1974). 
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in the Court to be associated with change in behavior patterns at the level of 
the individual justice. 
Historically, a president has been able to appoint a new justice to the Court 
about once every 23.6 months. President ixon, on the other hand, appointed 
four justices in three years. One would not be too surprised to find that 
exchanging four members of a nine member group in such a short period of 
time is disruptive - irrespective of ideology. But in this case the Nixon 
appointees were chosen in such a way as to maximize the ideological dis-
parities between the new appointees and the justices they replaced. These 
disparities have been used to explain differences in plenary case voting 
patterns between the Warren and Burger Courts. Our interest, however , is in 
conflict patterns as represented by dis ents to denials of re iew and changes in 
these patterns across the two Courts. 
At least three possible kinds of change in conflict patterns may be investi-
gated: (1) change in the extent to which cases involving dissent to denials of 
review occur, (2) change in the conflict patterns exhibited by the Warren 
Court justices and their replacements (Warren-Burger , Black-Blackmun , 
Harlan-Powell, and Fortas-Rehnquist ), and (3) change in the conflict behavior 
of the "holdover justices" (Douglas, Brennan, Marshall , Stewart , and White ). 
These three possibilities will be examined in the same order. 
The data to be used consists of all cases in which dissents to denials of review 
occurred in the 1964-68 and the 1972-76 terms inclusively. These are the five 
terms preceding the appointment of the first ixon justice and the five terms 
immediately following the seating of the last ixon justice. 12 Votes in the cases 
and other appropriate data have been taken from U. S. Law Week. 
Change in Conflict at the Level of the Court: 
One obvious fact in comparing our two five term period is the dramatic 
increase in the number of instances in which review was denied. The mean for 
the first period was 2478 per term . But in the second period , the mean is 3500 
cases per term. This tells us that a good many more litigants are being 
disappointed by the Court in the Burger era. It reflects the fact that the Court 
is limited (by time considerations ) to reviewing fully about 150 cases per term 
while the number of applications for such review has increased from about 
2000 per term in 1964 to about 4000 per term in 1976. 
There is no particular reason to expect the increase in number of denial 
cases to increase the rate at which conflict over denials occur - at least as 
measurerd by dissent cases. In Table I , we present the 's for total number of 
denial cases per term, the number of cases in which dissents to denial were 
published , and the dissent cases as a percentage of denial cases. The table is 
revealing. It shows that some variation occurred in the rate of dissent cases 
12 S. Sidney Ulmer and John Stookey, " ixon's Legacy to the Supreme Court: A Statistical 
Analysis," Florida State University Law Review , Vol. 3 (1975), pp . 331-1347 . 
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whether one looks at the ten year period or either of the five year spans. It is 
clear , how ver, that the greatest variation occurred between the last term of 
the Warren Court and the first term of the Burger era. A second dramatic 
change in dissent rate is noticeable between the 1972, 1973, and 1974 terms 
and the 1975, 1976 terms. 
A second way of measuring conflict in the Court is to look at the number of 
dissenting votes cast - term by term. Table Ia provides that information for 
the ten terms. Again we see that the average rate of dissent voting is 
dramatically greater in the 1972, 1973, and 1974 terms. But both tables 
suggest that conflict was lower in the 1975 and 1976 terms than in any term 
other than 1964. Reflection suggests two possible explanations for these 
patterns. It is possibl e that the transition from the Warren to the Burger Court 
was sufficiently h·aumatic to in rease conflict substantially in the early Burger 
years but that conflict over case selection diminished after a "shake down " 
period - i.e. , that the justices losing the s lection arguments in 1972, 1973 
and 1974 either started to win th ese arguments in 1975 and 1976, or became 
tired of the conh·oversies and acquiecsed in the "inevitable. " 
A better explanation, however , is derived from the observation that the 
drop off in 1975 coincided with th e departure of W. 0. Douglas from the 
Court. 13 It so happens that Douglas was the most prolific dissenter to denials 
of review the Court has ever seen. In Table II , we report the average number 
of cases per term in which dissent to denial occurred and the average number 
of dissents per justi .ce for each term of the Court. In general, Douglas 
dissented in about 90% of the dissent cases. The next highest dissenter -
Marshall - is found dissenting in only 14% of the dissent cases. And Hugo 
Black- the perennial cohort of Douglas -dissented at a rate ofonly 13%. All 
this suggests that the lumping of dissenting votes in the 1972, 1973, and 1974 
terms might be attributable to Douglas . In fact, Douglas contributed 75 
perc nt of the dissenting votes cast in the 1972 term. Comparable figur for 
the 1973 and 1974 terms are 75 percent and 57 percent respectiv ely. If we 
subtract the Douglas votes from all t n terms , the figures become as porh·ayed 
in Table III. If we perform the same surgery on Table I, we derive Table Illa. 
Analysis of Tables III and Illa with a Mann-Whitn ey statistical mod el14 
reve als that with Douglas excluded, there is no signiflcant change in the 
number of denial cases involving dissent. (U = 9 and p = .274) Thus , though 
conflict as represented by dissent cases did increase in the Burger Court, that 
increase was solely a function of the dissatisfaction expres eel by Douglas 
during his last three complete terms on the Court. For Tabl e III , however , U 
= 3 and p = .028, we infer that even w.ithout Douglas , there was a significant 
13 Douglas retired effective ovember 12, 1975. 
14 Hub ert Blalock, Social Statistics , ew York: Harp er and Row (1960), pp. 197-203; Sidney 
Siegel, 011-Paramet,ic StatisUcsfor the Behar;ioral Sciences, New York: McGraw- Hill, 1956, pp. 
116-127. 
6 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
TABLE I. Conflict in the Court: Cases Involving Dissent to Denials of 
Review 
1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms 
Term 
# of Cases 
in which 
review denied 
# of cases 
involving 
dissent to 
denial 
# of dissent 
cases a % 
of denials 
1964 65 66 67 68 72 73 74 75 76 
1974 2438 2638 2478 2860 3299 3347 3508 3713 3633 
48 225 166 180 128 460 527 367 123 119 
2.43 9.22 6.29 7.26 4.47 13.94 15.74 10.46 3.31 3.27 
TABLE Ia. Conflict in the Court: umber of Dissenting Votes to Denials of 
Review 
1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms 
Tenn 1964 65 66 67 68 72 73 74 75 76 
Dis sent votes 
in denial 63 250 263 256 18 518 673 549 233 223 
cases 
Average 
dissent votes .03 .10 .09 .10 .06 .15 .20 .15 .06 .06 
per case 
change in the number of dissenting votes cast in denial cases between the 
Warren and Burg er Court periods. At the same tim e, it is obvious that the 
degree of change is not massive once Douglas is excluded and the lumping of 
cases and otes in the 1972-74 terms is smoothed out con iderably . 
Other evidence of change in conflict over denials of review can be found by 
examining th e three areas of greatest conflict - Obscenity, Search and 
Seizure , and Counsel. If the cases involving such issues in the ten terms 
studied are broken clown for the Warren and Burger periods , we find that 
conflict dimini~hecl in th e area of Counsel but increased dramatically in the 
other two areas. Of twenty-eight Counsel cases in which dissent to denial 
occurred, 17 or 61 % occu 1Ted in the first period while 11 or 39% occurred in 
the second. For Search and Seizure, on the other hand , 25 of 106 cases (23.6%) 
CHANGING PATTERNS OF CONFLICT 7 
TABLE II. Denial of Review Cases 1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms: Average 
Number of Dissents by Justice by Term* 
1 2 ½ 
Justice # of dissents # of terms** Average # of dissents 
Marshall ....... 231 7 33 
Douglas ....... . 1877 9 208.6 
Black .......... 148 5 29.6 
Brennan ..... .. 306 10 30.6 
Harlan ....... .. 33 5 6.6 
White . . . ... .. . 118 10 11.8 
Stewart ........ 190 10 19 
Warren ........ 79 5 15.8 
Fortas . . . . . . . . . 67 4 16.7 
Goldberg ... ' .. 3 1 3 
Rehnquist . . .... 4 5 .8 
Powell ......... 42 5 8.4 
Blackmun .... . . 85 5 17 
Burger ......... 27 5 5.4 
Stevens ........ 5 2 2.5 
Court .......... 2343 10 234.3 
* Excludes justices with no dissents 
** Includ es partial terms for some justic es 
TABLE III. Conflicts in the Court: Number of Dissenting Votes to Denial of 
Review, 1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms -Excluding Votes by W. 
0. Douglas 
Tenn 1964 65 66 67 68 72 73 74 75 76 
Dissent votes 
in denial 26 50 125 125 106 81 169 237 197 223 
cases 
Average 
dissent votes .013 .021 .047 .05044 .037 .024 .05049 .067 .053 .060 
per case 
are found in the Warren era while 81 or 76.4 % are associated with the Burger 
Court. And for Obscenity , the figures are 11 of87 or 12.6% in the first period 
and 76 or 87.3% in th e 1972-76 terms inclusive. These figures suggest that 
there is considerab ly greater disagreement in the Burger Court than in the 
Warren Court over which cases to review in the areas of obscenity and search 
8 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIE CE 
TABLE ma. Conflicts in the Court: Number of Cases Involving Dissents to 
Denials of Review 1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms - Excluding 
Cases in Which W. 0. Douglas was a Solo Dissenter 
Tenn 
umber of 
cases in 
which 
review 
denied 
Number of 
dissent 
cases as 
% of d nial 
1964 65 66 67 68 72 73 74 75 76 
1974 2438 2638 2478 2860 3299 3347 3508 3713 3633 
1.1 1.4 2.8 3.8 2.6 1.6 2.7 3.2 2.7 3.2 
and seizure. Br aking this data down by term , however , provides additional 
perspective. 
Table IV summarizes the data for cases on the appellate docket. The first 
thing that catches the eye in Table IV is the dramatic drop in conflict o er 
denials in Search and Seizure and Obscenity cases after the 1974 term. Since 
this again coincides with the retirement of Dou glas from the Court, one may 
surmis that the Douglas resignation accounts for the diminishing conflict in 
these areas . An examination of the Dou gla dissent in the 1973 and 1974 
terms reveals that he dissented in 42 of 56 d nial cases in olving obscenity. At 
the same time, however, Marshall dissented in 35 of the 42 cases. Thus, the 
retirement of Dou glas cannot account for the drop in conflict in such cases to 
18 instances - in 16 of which Marshall found reason to dissent. As for searc h 
and seizure, Douglas dissented in 53 such cases in the 1973 and 1974 terms, in 
three of which Marshall dissented. In the 1975 and 1976 tenns, 1arshall 
dissented in 2 of 5 such cases. Even so, the drop canno t be attribu ted to th e 
Douglas retirement. It may be that the changes in conflict inferred are due to a 
decrease in the number of search/seizure and obscenity cases coming to the 
Court in the 1975 and 1976 terms. Or perhaps , the Court began to take more 
cases in the e areas in 1975. Unfortunate ly, the first supposition must wait for 
evaluation until additional data from the larger research project are at hand. 
As for th e second, the Court heard one obscenity and six search and seizure 
cases in the 1975 term. Consequently , dissent to denial did not decrease as a 
function of greater Court acquiescence in the dissenters point of view. 
Change in Conflict as a Function of Change in Justices 
The second possibility to be explored is that the exchange of the four ixon 
justices - Burger Blackmun , Powell, and Rehnquist - for Warren , Black, 
CHANGING PATTERNS OF CONFLICT 9 
TABLE IV. Cases Involving Dissent to Denial of Review in Three Selected 
Areas: Appellate Docket , 1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms Inclusive 
Search and 
Tenn Counsel Cases Seizure Cases Obscenity Cases 
1964 .... . ... 0 1 0 
65 ........ 7 4 1 
66 ........ 2 7 4 
67 .. ...... 6 6 5 
68 .. .. .... 2 7 l 
72 .. . ..... 0 18 2 
73 . . ...... 7 42 21 
74 .. . .. ... 1 16 35 
75 .. . ..... 1 3 9 
76 ........ 2 2 9 
Total ..... . . 28 106 87 
Harlan and Fortas - has caused conflict in the Court to increase or decrease . 
We have at least one theoretical reason for choosing the direction of change 
here - i.e. , for believing that the ixon justices would have greater control 
over access to the Court than the justices they replaced. Thi expectation is 
derived from the fact that the four appointees to the current Court were all 
chosen by the same president in a relatively short time pan. The four 
replaced justices , on the other hand , were selected by three different Presi-
dents over widely dispersed intervals. Black was appointed in 1937, Warren in 
1953, Harlan in 1955, and Fortas in 1965. Moreover , pe1formance in the 
Court clearly differentiated Harlan from his three colleagues , though con-
cededly to separate the other three from each other would require more 
complex analysis. 
TABLE V. Percentage Frequencies of Dissent in Cases Denied Review 
1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms* by Selected Justices 
Terms 
Justices 1964 65 66 67 68 72 73 74 75 76 
B1-Blm .96 .77 1.11 2.01 1.01 .27 .50 .51 .43 .68 
Ha-Po .00 .32 .18 .28 .41 .12 .11 .19 .32 .41 
Fo-Reh .16 1.28 .76 .34 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Wa-Bu .00 .73 1.17 .84 .62 .00 .14 .17 .18 .22 
* Five terms for all justic es except Fortas 
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TABLE Va. Mann-Whitney U Test of Data in Table V 
Probability of 
justices Ni N2 u No Difference 
Bl-Blm 5 5 0 <.004 
Ha-Po 5 5 12 <.5 
Fo-Reh 4 5 0 <.004 
Wa-Bu 5 5 4.5 >.05 
Table V summarizes the data relevant to our expectations, while Table Va 
reports the result of a Mann-Whitney test. The analysis shows that the 
exchange ofBlackmun for Black and Rehnquist for Fortas did produce signifi-
cantly less conflict or dissent to denials of review - a finding consistent with 
our expectations. The same hypothesis was not validated for the Harlan-
Powell exchange. For the Warren-Burger swap , no significant change in 
conflict may be inferred from the statistical analysis. However , this appears to 
be one of those instances when common sense would modify the statistical 
results. It is obvious that i.f the 1964 and 1972 terms are eliminated , change in 
conflict may be inferred. Elimination of these terms, redoing the Mann-
Whitney analysis, provides a U of O and a p of .004. We believe - given the 
dispersion of the data - that the best inference here is that conflict associated 
with the Warren-Burger seat in the Court has decreased significantly in the 
later period. 
Change in Conflict Attributable to the "Holdover" justices: 
Five justices - Marshall, Douglas, Brennan , Stewart, and White-served 
in some or all of both the time periods studied in this paper. It is possible to 
examine the conflict behavior of these justices across two courts. Assuming 
Nixon's success in appointing ideological clones who stand in antithesis to the 
justices they replaced, the ideological posture of the Court vis a vis decisions 
in plenary cases should be somewhat different from that of the Warr n Court. 
Indeed , that proposition is already amply supported in the literature. 15 The 
question is whether such a difference impacts on the selection of cases for 
review and dissents to denials of review. 
It is reported elsewhere that the appointment of the four Nixon justices is 
associated with a significant increase in the dissent rates of Marshall , Douglas, 
and Brennan in plenary cases. 16 The dissent rates of Stewart and White, on 
the other hand, do not appear to have been impacted by the singing of the 
15 Washy , 1976, op . cit . 
16 S. Sidney Ulmer and William W. icholls , Jr. , "The Integration of Dissent Behavior in the 
U.S . SupremeCourt ," Jurimetrics]ournal, Vol. 19 (1978). pp.173-178. 
CHANGING PATTERNS OF CONFLICT 11 
Nixon quartet. Without going into the detail ed causes of such a differential 
consequence , these facts provide a basis for sev eral hypotheses when viewed 
against the finding that ideology influences behavior in disparate decisional 
arenas of the Court. Other research has shown, for example, that the rate at 
which a justice supports federal or state authority in plenar-y cases is highly 
correlated with the rate at which he denies review of stat and federal 
"victories" in the lower courts. 17 And a significant association has been found 
between the vote of the ju tices in selecting cases for re iew and their votes on 
the merits when the selected cases are reviewed. 18 
If we characterize the completion of the ixon appointments to the Court as 
N-4, we may offer three definitions and three hypotheses . 
Defi nition l : 
A holdover justice who increase the frequency of his dissents in cases fully 
reviewe d on the merits subsequent to -4 is defined as an Upper. 
Defi nition 2: 
A holdover justice who decreases the frequency of his dissents in cases fully 
r viewed on the merits subsequent to N-4 is defined as a Downer. 
Defin ition 3: 
A holdover justice who maintains the same frequency of dissent in cases 
fully reviewed on the merits subsequent to N-4 is defined as a Homeostat. 
Each of the definitions, D1-Da , has specific implications. To define one as 
an Upper implies an inability to participate in the control of decisional out-
come as frequently as before. For the Downer, one may infer greater partici-
pation. The Homeostat , on the other hand , may be thought to exhibit stable 
behavior unaffected by -4. Since major change in Court personnel has b en 
shown to impact on dissent rate in fully reviewed cases, an effect at other 
levels of decision making may be anticipated. Stated in th form of hypoth-
eses , the expectations deriv d from these considerations are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1. 
Uppers will increase , to a statistically significant degree , the frequency of 
their dissents to denials of review subsequent to -4. 
fl ypothesis 2: 
Downers will decrease , to a statistically significant degree , the frequency of 
their dissents to denials of review subsequent to -4. 
17 S. Sidney Ulmer, ··sup reme Court Justices as Strict and ot So Strict Constructionists: 
Some Implications ,·· Law and Society Review. (Fall 1973), pp. 13-32. 
18 S. Sidney Ulmer , "The Decision to Grant ertiorari as an Indication to Decision on the 
Merits ," Polity , Vol. 4 (1972) pp . 439-447. 
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Hypoth esis 3: 
Homeostats will show no statistically significant variation in the frequency 
of their dissents to denials of review subsequent to N-4 . 
Table VI provides the data necessary for testing two of these hypotheses 
with a Mann-Whitney U test. On the basis of Defmitions 1 and 3, Douglas , 
Brennan , and Marshall are correctly identified as Uppers in plenary cases. 
Stewart and White , on the other hand , are Homeostats in such cases. Table VI 
and Vla reveal that for Uppers , the disparities in dissents to denial ofreview 
between the two periods (N 1 and 2) could have occurred by chance less than 
one time in a hundred for Douglas , less than four times in a thousand for 
Brennan , and less than five times in a hundred for Marshall. Hypothesis 1, 
therefore , cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that White and Stewart will not vary their dissent 
frequencies significantly in denial cases since neither did so in cases decided 
on the merits. Since the probability of the difference occurring by chance is 
.111 for White , traditional standards prevent us from rejecting hypothesis 3 in 
his case. 
For Stewart , the situation differs . In denial cases , he shows a significant 
disparity (p. = . 028) between 1 and N2. Thus , hypothesis 3 must be rejected 
for Stewart. 
The significance of these findings lies on several dimensions. For 4 of 5 
justices (80%), our results constitute additional evidence for th proposition 
that judicial behavior is integrated in a holistic sense - that the "causes" of 
voting behavior in one decisional arena may operate to produce similar 
behavior patterns in another decisional context. Specifically , the suggestion 
here is that the factors that promote dissent at one d cisional I vel promote 
similar di sent patterns at a second level. It should be noted that we do not 
identify cau ative factors but they undoubtedly inhere in the differing out-
looks of the justic sand the distribution of th s outlooks in the Warren and 
Burger Courts. Thus , disagr ement of ajustic with tho e controlling decision 
at either level may , via small group processes , make disagreement at the other 
level more likely . 
As for Stewart , the reasons why he does not conform to the prediction made 
for him are not self evid nt. However, some fairly plausible speculations can 
be offered. It may be that Stewart's behavior in the two kinds of cases is located 
on two separate dimensions. It is also possible that rol conceptions are at 
work. A dissent in a denial case , while published , is not as v.isible as one cast in 
a plenary case. Stewart may ha e come to feel that dissents in fully reviewed 
cases should be more restricted than dissents in denial cases. Or , perhaps , 
Stewart is lesi happy with the cases being selected for review but once 
accepted finds himself influenced by the arguments of his majority colleagues 
to a greater extent than when voting on appellate applications for re iew . After 
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TABLE VI. Percentage Frequencies of Dissent in Denial of Review Cases, 
U.S. Supreme Court, 1964-68 and 1972-76 Terms, by Selected 
Justices 
Period 1 (N-4) Period 2 
Justices 1964 65 66 67 68 72 73 74 75 76 
Douglas 3.81 8.20 5.23 5.33 2.90 13.34 15.06 12.43 * 
Brennan .10 .08 .34 .20 .31 .73 1.58 1.97 1.89 1.84 
Marshall .32 .24 .55 1.37 1.68 1.51 1.24 
Stewart 000 .08 .49 .69 .31 .48 .78 1.62 .59 .99 
Whit e 000 .29 .08 1.78 .45 .33 .57 .57 .54 .69 
• Du e to a low rate of parti cipation , dissents for Douglas in his last term (partial) are not 
considered . 
TABLE Vla. Mann-Whitney U Test of Data in Table VI 
Justi ce N1 N2 u p 
Douglas 5 3 0 <.018 
Brennan 5 5 0 <.004 
Marshall 2 5 0 <.047 
Stewart 5 5 3 <.028 
Whit e 5 5 6 < .111 
all, a good deal less time is spent in discussing jurisdictional applications and 
explaining positions taken on them than in plenary cases . 
It is theoretically possible that dissents to denials of review do not reflect 
"tru e dissent" given an earlier role prescription against making such dissents 
public. Several things can be said about such a possibility-though we cannot 
completely rule it out for all justices. In the first place , the same observation 
can be made about dissents in plenary cases. Some dissents are repressed in 
such cases. We do not know how many . Secondly, none of our five justices 
thought it completely beyond the pale of proper behavior to publish a dissent 
to a denial ofreview. All five did so in both the Warren and Burger periods. 
Finally , if change in attitude toward publishing dissents explains the change 
patterns we have revealed, then the dissents should increase randomly across 
subject matter areas. This is simply not the case. While White decreased his 
dissent rate in criminal cases significantly in the Burger Court period , Mar-
shall, Brennan , and Stewart showed significant increases in dissents in such 
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cases. Marshall, Brennan, and Stewart also wrote over 50 dissenting opinions 
each in obscenity cases in the Burger era while writing not a single such 
dissent in the Warren period. As for the remaining justice, he himself settles 
the question for us. Writing in his autobiography, Douglas tells the following 
story: 
"When I came on the Court Hugo Black talked to me about his idea of 
having every vote on every case made public. In cases taken and argued, 
the vote of each justice was eventually known. But in cases where appeals 
were dismissed out of hand or certiorari denied, no votes were recorded 
publicly. I thought his idea an excellent one and backed it when he 
proposed to the conference that it be adopted. But the requisite votes 
were not available then or subsequently. As a result he and I started to 
note our dissents from denials of certiorari and dismissals of appeals in 
important cases. Gradually the practice spread to a few other justices; and 
finally I ended up in the sixties noting my vote in all cases where 
dismissals or denials were contrary to my convictions." (emphasis add-
ed)19 
Assuming that Douglas is not prevaricating, we must conclude that the 
increase in dissent to denials of review attributed to him in the five Burger 
terms was not a result of any attitude change on his part respecting dissent 
practices. 
Summary and C ondusions 
Our investigation of conflict over denials of review in the Supreme Court 
and changes in that conflict across the 1964-68 and 1972-76 terms must be 
viewed as strict ly exploratory. Since very little is known about this area of 
Court activity, we have felt justified in offering a good bit of descriptive data in 
the paper along with some underdeveloped theoretical notions. 
In general, our observations may be summarized as follows: 
l. The Court is denying review to a much greater number of cases in the 
Burger as compared to the Warren period. 
2. As measured by total number of dissenting votes cast in denial cases, 
conflict in the Burger Court was significantly above the level reached in the 
Warren Court. 
3. As measured by total number of denial cases in which dissent occurred, 
19 W. 0. Douglas , Go East Young Man, ew York: Random House (1974) p. 452. This is 
somewhat ironic given Black's later defense of secrecy in the Court. But it is not incompatible with 
his view that the sanctity of the Conference should be observed , or - as he put it-" . .. ifhe 
(Karl Llewellyn ) meant by the remark you quoted that the Court 's conferences should be held 
out in the public before radio or television , I disagree with him." (Letter to th Senior Author , 
October 22, 1970). 
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conflict in the Burger Court was significantly above that achieved in the 
Warren Court. 
4. The increase in denial cases accompanied by dissent in the Burger period 
can be accounted for by the solo dissents of William 0. Douglas. 
5. ln the most active area of dissent - obscenity cases - there was a 
significantly greater degree of conflict over denials in the Burger period with 
obvious clustering in the 1972-74 terms. 
6. When Nixon justices are compared to the justices they replaced, signill-
cant change in conflict was observed for three of the four exchanges. In the 
case of the Harlan-Powell exchang e, no significant variation was found. This is 
consistent with other research indicating that Powell differs in some respects 
from bis three brother appointees. 20 
7. When th e holdover justices are compared to themselves across two 
Courts, a change to greater conflict in the second Court was observed for 4 of 
the 5. On th e basis of dissent patterns in plenary cases, such change was 
predicted for 3 of the 4. As predicted, no significant change was found for 
Justice White. As for the missed prediction - Stewart - some speculative 
explanations have been discussed. Overall , these results lend credence to the 
views that: (1) the beha ior of the justices in the Supreme Court is sometimes 
integrated across two decisional contexts, and (2) changing the ideological 
compos ition of th e Court is likely to change the degree and patterns of conflict 
among the justices not only in plenary cases, but also in other decisional arenas 
- especial ly that arena in which cases are being selected for plenary review. 
20 Ulmer and Stookey, op. cit. 
